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CHAPTER XIX
OF THE SEVERAL KINDS OF COMMONWEALTH BY INSTITUTION, AND OF SUCCESSION TO THE SOVEREIGN POWER
THE difference of Commonwealths consisteth in the difference of the sovereign, or the person representative of all and
every one of the multitude. And because the sovereignty is either in one man, or in an assembly of more than one; and into
that assembly either every man hath right to enter, or not every one, but certain men distinguished from the rest; it is manifest
there can be but three kinds of Commonwealth. For the representative must needs be one man, or more; and if more, then it
is the assembly of all, or but of a part. When the representative is one man, then is the Commonwealth a monarchy; when an
assembly of all that will come together, then it is a democracy, or popular Commonwealth; when an assembly of a part only,
then it is called an aristocracy. Other kind of Commonwealth there can be none: for either one, or more, or all, must have
the sovereign power (which I have shown to be indivisible) entire.
There be other names of government in the histories and books of policy; as tyranny and oligarchy; but they are not the
names of other forms of government, but of the same forms misliked. For they that are discontented under monarchy call it
tyranny; and they that are displeased with aristocracy call it oligarchy: so also, they which find themselves grieved under
a democracy call it anarchy, which signifies want of government; and yet I think no man believes that want of government is
any new kind of government: nor by the same reason ought they to believe that the government is of one kind when they like
it, and another when they mislike it or are oppressed by the governors.
It is manifest that men who are in absolute liberty may, if they please, give authority to one man to represent them every
one, as well as give such authority to any assembly of men whatsoever; and consequently may subject themselves, if they think
good, to a monarch as absolutely as to other representative. Therefore, where there is already erected a sovereign power,
there can be no other representative of the same people, but only to certain particular ends, by the sovereign limited. For
that were to erect two sovereigns; and every man to have his person represented by two actors that, by opposing one another,
must needs divide that power, which (if men will live in peace) is indivisible; and thereby reduce the multitude into the
condition of war, contrary to the end for which all sovereignty is instituted. And therefore as it is absurd to think that
a sovereign assembly, inviting the people of their dominion to send up their deputies with power to make known their advice
or desires should therefore hold such deputies, rather than themselves, for the absolute representative of the people; so
it is absurd also to think the same in a monarchy. And I know not how this so manifest a truth should of late be so little
observed: that in a monarchy he that had the sovereignty from a descent of six hundred years was alone called sovereign, had
the title of Majesty from every one of his subjects, and was unquestionably taken by them for their king, was notwithstanding
never considered as their representative; that name without contradiction passing for the title of those men which at his
command were sent up by the people to carry their petitions and give him, if he permitted it, their advice. Which may serve
as an admonition for those that are the true and absolute representative of a people, to instruct men in the nature of that
office, and to take heed how they admit of any other general representation upon any occasion whatsoever, if they mean to
discharge the trust committed to them.
The difference between these three kinds of Commonwealth consisteth, not in the difference of power, but in the difference
of convenience or aptitude to produce the peace and security of the people; for which end they were instituted. And to compare
monarchy with the other two, we may observe: first, that whosoever beareth the person of the people, or is one of that assembly
that bears it, beareth also his own natural person. And though he be careful in his politic person to procure the common interest,
yet he is more, or no less, careful to procure the private good of himself, his family, kindred and friends; and for the most
part, if the public interest chance to cross the private, he prefers the private: for the passions of men are commonly more
potent than their reason. From whence it follows that where the public and private interest are most closely united, there
is the public most advanced. Now in monarchy the private interest is the same with the public. The riches, power, and honour
of a monarch arise only from the riches, strength, and reputation of his subjects. For no king can be rich, nor glorious,
nor secure, whose subjects are either poor, or contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissension, to maintain a war against
their enemies; whereas in a democracy, or aristocracy, the public prosperity confers not so much to the private fortune of
one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, or a civil war.
Secondly, that a monarch receiveth counsel of whom, when, and where he pleaseth; and consequently may hear the opinion
of men versed in the matter about which he deliberates, of what rank or quality soever, and as long before the time of action
and with as much secrecy as he will. But when a sovereign assembly has need of counsel, none are admitted but such as have
a right thereto from the beginning; which for the most part are of those who have been versed more in the acquisition of wealth
than of knowledge, and are to give their advice in long discourses which may, and do commonly, excite men to action, but not
govern them in it. For the understanding is by the flame of the passions never enlightened, but dazzled: nor is there any
place or time wherein an assembly can receive counsel secrecy, because of their own multitude.
Thirdly, that the resolutions of a monarch are subject to no other inconstancy than that of human nature; but in assemblies,
besides that of nature, there ariseth an inconstancy from the number. For the absence of a few that would have the resolution,
once taken, continue firm (which may happen by security, negligence, or private impediments), or the diligent appearance of
a few of the contrary opinion, undoes today all that was concluded yesterday.
Fourthly, that a monarch cannot disagree with himself, out of envy or interest; but an assembly may; and that to such
a height as may produce a civil war.
Fifthly, that in monarchy there is this inconvenience; that any subject, by the power of one man, for the enriching of
a favourite or flatterer, may be deprived of all he possesseth; which I confess is a great an inevitable inconvenience. But
the same may as well happen where the sovereign power is in an assembly: for their power is the same; and they are as subject
to evil counsel, and to be seduced by orators, as a monarch by flatterers; and becoming one another's flatterers, serve one
another's covetousness and ambition by turns. And whereas the favourites of monarchs are few, and they have none else to advance
but their own kindred; the favourites of an assembly are many, and the kindred much more numerous than of any monarch. Besides,
there is no favourite of a monarch which cannot as well succour his friends as hurt his enemies: but orators, that is to say,
favourites of sovereign assemblies, though they have great power to hurt, have little to save. For to accuse requires less
eloquence (such is man's nature) than to excuse; and condemnation, than absolution, more resembles justice.
Sixthly, that it is an inconvenience in monarchy that the sovereignty may descend upon an infant, or one that cannot discern
between good and evil: and consisteth in this, that the use of his power must be in the hand of another man, or of some assembly
of men, which are to govern by his right and in his name as curators and protectors of his person and authority. But to say
there is inconvenience in putting the use of the sovereign power into the hand of a man, or an assembly of men, is to say
that all government is more inconvenient than confusion and civil war. And therefore all the danger that can be pretended
must arise from the contention of those that, for an office of so great honour and profit, may become competitors. To make
it appear that this inconvenience proceedeth not from that form of government we call monarchy, we are to consider that the
precedent monarch hath appointed who shall have the tuition of his infant successor, either expressly by testament, or tacitly
by not controlling the custom in that case received: and then such inconvenience, if it happen, is to be attributed, not to
the monarchy, but to the ambition and injustice of the subjects, which in all kinds of government, where the people are not
well instructed in their duty and the rights of sovereignty, is the same. Or else the precedent monarch hath not at all taken
order for such tuition; and then the law of nature hath provided this sufficient rule, that the tuition shall be in him that
hath by nature most interest in the preservation of the authority of the infant, and to whom least benefit can accrue by his
death or diminution. For seeing every man by nature seeketh his own benefit and promotion, to put an infant into the power
of those that can promote themselves by his destruction or damage is not tuition, but treachery. So that sufficient provision
being taken against all just quarrel about the government under a child, if any contention arise to the disturbance of the
public peace, it is not to be attributed to the form of monarchy, but to the ambition of subjects and ignorance of their duty.
On the other side, there is no great Commonwealth, the sovereignty whereof is in a great assembly, which is not, as to consultations
of peace, and war, and making of laws, in the same condition as if the government were in a child. For as a child wants the
judgement to dissent from counsel given him, and is thereby necessitated to take the advice of them, or him, to whom he is
committed; so an assembly wanteth the liberty to dissent from the counsel of the major part, be it good or bad. And as a child
has need of a tutor, or protector, to preserve his person and authority; so also in great Commonwealths the sovereign assembly,
in all great dangers and troubles, have need of custodes libertatis; that is, of dictators, or protectors of their authority;
which are as much as temporary monarchs to whom for a time they may commit the entire exercise of their power; and have, at
the end of that time, been oftener deprived thereof than infant kings by their protectors, regents, or any other tutors.
Though the kinds of sovereignty be, as I have now shown, but three; that is to say, monarchy, where one man has it; or
democracy, where the general assembly of subjects hath it; or aristocracy, where it is in an assembly of certain persons nominated,
or otherwise distinguished from the rest: yet he that shall consider the particular Commonwealths that have been and are in
the world will not perhaps easily reduce them to three, and may thereby be inclined to think there be other forms arising
from these mingled together. As for example, elective kingdoms; where kings have the sovereign power put into their hands
for a time; or kingdoms wherein the king hath a power limited: which governments are nevertheless by most writers called monarchy.
Likewise if a popular or aristocratical Commonwealth subdue an enemy's country, and govern the same by a president, procurator,
or other magistrate, this may seem perhaps, at first sight, to be a democratical or aristocratical government. But it is not
so. For elective kings are not sovereigns, but ministers of the sovereign; nor limited kings sovereigns, but ministers of
them that have the sovereign power; nor are those provinces which are in subjection to a democracy or aristocracy of another
Commonwealth democratically or aristocratically governed, but monarchically....
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